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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal 
Corporation of the State of Utah, 
Appellant and Plaintiff, 
- vs. -
TOWNE HOUSE ATHLETIC 
CLUB and THE UNIVERSITY 
CLUB, 
Respondents and Defendants. 
Case No. 
10640 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS-DEFENDANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought an action in the District Court 
of Salt Lake County to collect a restaurant license 
foe from the defendants. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOvVER COURT 
Defendants' motion for Summary Judgment 
was g1·anted in part, and the Complaint of the plain-
tiff was dismissed. The court held that the state 
had not pre-empted to itself the right to license and 
regulate the defendants but dismissed plaintiff's 
Complaint because it had failed to enact a proper 
ordinance to license and regulate the defendants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek affirmance of that portion of 
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the judgment of the lower court dismissing plain-
tiff's Complaint. Defendants seek reversal of that 
portion of the judgment wherein the court held that 
the state of Utah had not pre-empted to itself the 
right to license and regulate these defendants for 
the reason that it is clear as a matter of law from 
the statutes that the plaintiff has no right to licensP, 
charge a license fee or regulate the defendants. Tht' 
defendants request this court to direct the lower 
court to enter its order decreeing that the plaintiff 
does not have a right to license, charge a license fee 
or regulate the defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A stipulation of facts involved in this case was 
entered into between the plaintiff and defendants on 
the 18th day of November, 1965 (R9) and has been 
quoted in full in plaintiff's Statement of Facts and 
defendants agree with the plaintiff's Statement of 
the Facts wherein it sets forth this stipulation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 
BELOW, DETERMINING THAT THE PLAINTIFF MAY 
NOT IMPOSE A RESTAURANT LICENSE AND 
CHARGE A LICENSE FEE UPON THE DEFENDANTS 
WHO ARE PRIVATE, NON-PROFIT INCORPORATED 
SOCIAL CLUBS IS CORRECT AND SHOULD BE SUS· 
TAINED. 
The plaintiff seeks to impose a restaurant fee 
on the defendants and relies upon the following state 
statutes for its authority: 
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Section 10-8-39, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
~1:; amended which empowers the city to license, tax 
and l'egulate ... boarding houses, restaurants, eating 
houses; ... 
Sedion 10-8-80, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended which grants to cities the right to raise 
rr,·enue by levying and collecting a license fee or 
tax on any business within the limits of the city; 
and ... (Emphasis ours) 
Section 10-8-81, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, states as follows: 
"They may regulate all social clubs, recrea-
tional associations, athletic associations and 
kindred associations, whether incorporated or 
not, which maintain club rooms or regular 
meeting rooms within the corporate limits of 
the city" 
The city ordinance upon which plaintiff relies 
is Section 20-2-62 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City, 1955, which ordinance imposes a license 
fee on restaurants. The ordinance defines the term 
"restaurant" as being any place where food or drink 
is prepared, served, or offered for sale or sold for 
human consumption on or off the premises. The 
Utah State Statute from which the city derives its 
authority to enact such an ordinance does not define 
the term "restaurant." 
Since the Legislature did not define this term, 
we must look to case law to determine what in the 
absence of legislative definition, constitutes a "res-
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taurant." The case law on the subject has been sum 
marized in an opinion by the Salt Lake City Attornev 
dated December 18, 1958. The author of that opini~1; 
came to the following conclusion: 
"An examination of the cases defining 
'restaurant leads one to the conclusion that 
it is such an establishment as ordinarily serves 
meals and drinks to the public generally. An 
Illinois case, H olzen v. Chicago, 22 Ill. App. 
50, 136 N.E. 594, quotes from Webster's def-
inition of a restaurant as 'an establishment 
where refreshments or meals may be procured 
by the public; a public eating house.' Other 
cases so holding are Jackson v. Lane, 142 N.J. 
Eq. 193, 59 A.2d 662; Donahue v. Conant, 102 
Vt. 108, 146 A. 417; Food Corporation v. Zon-
ing Board of Adjustment of City of Phiki-
delphia, 384 Pa. 288, 121 A.2d 94; City of 
Flordell Hills v. Herdekopf, Mo. App., 271 
S."\V. 2d 256; San Francisco v. Larson, 166 
Cal. 179, 131 Pac. 366. And it has been said to 
mean where any person who conducts himself 
properly and is able and willing to pay for 
same 'has a right to demand that food be fur-
nished him.' (Emphasis Added.) Debenham 
v. Short, Tex. Civ. App., 199 S.W. 1147. See 
Annotation in 122 A.L.R. 1399." 
With this conclusion, the defendants are in com-
plete accord and this conclusion is substantiated by 
several cases decided subsequent to the City Attor-
ney's opinion defining "restaurant" as an establish-
ment where refreshments or meals may be procured 
by the public; meaning a public eating house. Druc-
ker vs. Frisina, 210 N.Y.S. 2d, 680, 681, 31 Misc. 2d, 
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l!HL Ap7Jcal of Langol, 104 A.2d, 343, 346, 175 Pa. 
~' 'P"l' 0•JQ ~'"'l Lt t-: , tJ_. • 
13ased upon the cases above referred to, the 
Salt Lake City Attorney, in his December 18, 1958 
opinion, came to the conclusion that clubs, such as 
tlH~ defendants, which provide meals to their mem-
bers and guests only (which has been stipulated to 
by the plaintiff) (R9) do not come within the gener-
ally accepted definition of "boarding house," "res-
taurant" and "eating house" as contained in Section 
10-8-39, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
Again we can agree with the opinion of the former 
Salt Lake City Attorney. Therefore, the ordinance 
under which Salt Lake City is attempting to license 
the defendants cannot and does not apply to social 
and athletic clubs which are not restaurants within 
the purview of the statute creating the authorization 
fol' the city to pass its restaurant ordinance. 
This conclusion is further substantiated by the 
fact that the Legislature has recognized in Section 
10-8-81, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
that social clubs and athletic associations are unique 
entities in and of themselves. The Legislature would 
not have seen fit to provide that cities and towns 
might regulate all social clubs, recreational associa-
tions, athletic associations, and kindred associations 
if it were its intention to regulate them as restaur-
ants or eating houses. If the Legislature had in-
tended for the city to regulate each activity which 
may be carried on within a social and athletic club, 
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then it would not have seen fit to empower cities 
and towns to regulate the clubs in toto. To accept 
the city's position, would be to allow the city to 
circumvent the statute empowering it to regulate 
social and athletic associations and compound thP 
license and tax on the social and athletic associations 
by allowing the city to license the clubs as restaur-
ants, dance halls, bowling alleys, and shoe shine 
shops, etc., which has been attempted by the city 
in the past. The Legislature, however, understood 
that social and athletic clubs present a unique situa-
tion since their operations encompass several types 
of activities. The Legislature, therefore, provided 
the cities with authority to regulate social clubs and 
not dismember them into various parts. The Legis-
lature did not authorize cities to regulate and license 
each activity. In 9 McQuillin, Municipal Corpora-
tions, Third Edition, Section 26-39, it states as 
follows: 
"Power to impose a license tax upon a busi-
ness does not authorize a division of the busi-
ness into its constituant elements, parts or 
incidents, and the levy of a separate tax on 
each element, part or incident thereof. A 
single taxable privilege may not be separate.cl 
into its various component elements as ordi-
narily recognized, and a separate license tax 
imposed on each element .... " 
The Plaintiff has never seen fit to enact an 
ordinance pursuant to the authority granted it under 
Section 10-8-81 to regulate social clubs and athletic 
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:1ssoeiations and, therefore, cannot demand a license 
fee in this case. 
The case of American Fork City vs. Robinson, 
et al, 77 Utah 168, 292 Pac. 249, deals with an ordi-
nance enacted by the city of American Fork which 
(L-fined clubs and club rooms and made it unlawful 
rnr <~ny pel'Son to play billiards or pool in any club 
room in the city. The defendants were tried and 
c:nnvictecl of playing pool in the club room and 
appealed to the Supreme Court. In its opinion this 
Court stated: 
"That the powers of the city are strictly lirn-
i ted to those expressly granted, to those nec-
essarily or fairly implied in or incident to 
the powers expressly granted, and to those 
essential to the declared objects and purposes 
of the corporation, it is settled law in this 
state. Salt Lake City vs. Sutter, 61 Utah, 
533, 216 P. 234." 
"\Ve therefore look to the legislative grants 
relied on to sustain the power to enact the 
ordinance in question." 
The Court reversed the convictions on the 
ground that the power had not been given to the city 
to enact such an ordinance. The laws of the State 
of Utah had empowered city councils with the power 
to "license, tax, regulate, and suppress billiard, pool, 
bagatelle, pigeon hole, or any other tables or imple-
ments kept or used for similar purposes. * * *" The 
laws of the State of Utah also granted powers to the 
city councils to "regulate all social clubs, recreational 
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associations, athletic associations, and kindred assei-
ciations, whether incorporated or not, which main. 
tain club rooms or regular meeting rooms within 
the corporate limits of the city." The ordinance en-
acted, however, generally prohibited any person from 
playing at billiards or pool upon any billiard or pool 
table in any club room. This court therefore held 
that the ordinance was not essential to the power 
to regulate or suppress the keeping of such tables, 
and that under the applicable strict rule of construc-
tion, the power of the city to enact the ordinance was 
denied and the ordinance was held invalid. 
The reverse situation is in existence in the case 
presently before the Court. The city has been given 
the power to enact an ordinance to regulate restaur-
ants which it has done. However, these defendants 
are not restaurants. They are social clubs and ath-
letic associations. The powers have been given to 
the cities to regulate some social clubs and athletic 
associations, but the city has not exercised this power 
and has not passed an ordinance pursuant to this 
legislative authority. Counsel for the plaintiff refers 
in his brief at page 7 to a "General Welfare Clause" 
and states that these powers, if granted, are as a 
rule designed to confer powers other than those 
specifically mentioned. Certainly if the city has au· 
thority to regulate these defendants, that power is 
specifically stated and there is no need to refer to a 
general welfare clause but there is a need to enact 
proper ordinance to put this power into effect. The 
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pl::imtiff also contends that in order to protect the 
public health, it is necessary for the city to have 
authuri ty to license the defendants. These def end-
ants certainly do not desire to create health hazards 
and have no objections to being inspected and super-
\'ised. They are in fact regulated under bond by 
rlw Utah Secretary of State. The question presented 
to this Court is not whether there should be regula-
tion of these defendants, but whether they should be 
regulated by the Secretary of State. If the city has 
the authority to regulate and license these defend-
ants, then by passing the proper ordinance such a 
purpose can be properly accomplished. 
POINT II 
THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT THAT 
THE STATE OF UTAH HAS NOT PRE-EMPTED TO 
lTSELF THE POWER TO REGULATE OR LICENSE 
THESE DEFENDANTS IS ERRONEOUS AND THE 
COURT SHOULD HAVE ENTERED ITS JUDGMENT 
DENYING TO THE PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO LI-
CENSE OR REGULATE THESE DEFENDANTS. 
The State has pre-empted to itself the right to 
regulate these defendants by virtue of Sections 16-6-
13, 16-6-13.l, 16-6-13.2, 16-6-13.3 and 16-6-14, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. Under the terms 
of these statutes the Secretary of State of the State 
of Utah is charged with the duty to determine 
whether any social club, recreational or .athletic asso-
ciation or kindred association incorporating under 
the provisions of that chapter is a bona fide club or 
association and whether the object of its existence 
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is for pecuniary profit. He is further charged 
111 
see th~t the clubs will ~ot ~e used for permitting , 
gamblmg or any other v10lation of law or ordinancl 
and he is given the power to hold hearings for th:: 
purpose of determining whether a club or association 
is operating in accordance with the law. The club.' 
are also required by the statute to maintain a 
$5,000.00 bond with the Secretary of State condi-
tioned upon the faithful performance of their obliga-
tions. In addition, Section 6-6-13.1 sets forth in 
specific detail fourteen different items which must 
be included in the constitution, bylaws and/or house 
rules of these non-profit social and athletic clubs. 
These provisions range over the full gamut of opera-
tions of a social and athletic club and are not limited 
to the narrow issue of the storage or consumption of 
liquor on the premises. 
Under Section 16-6-14 the specific authorization 
is given to all police officers to have the right t11 
enter the club rooms or meeting rooms of the social 
clubs, recreation or athletic associations or kindred 
associations incorporated under the provisions of the 
chapter for the purpose of determining whether any 
laws or ordinances are being violated therein. (Em· 
phasis ours) 
The sections of the Utah Code above referred to 
are part of the Utah Non-Profit Corporation Act, 
and create distinct and separate entities, known as 
social clubs, recreation, or athletic associations in· 
corporated as non-profit corporations which are reg· 
10 
ql;itC'<l hy the Secretary of State of the State of Utah. 
The unique status of such entities was recognized by 
the Legislature when it enacted Chapter 24, section 1 
Laws of Utah 1959 which was entitled "An act pro-
\'iding for the licensing and regulation of establish-
!llrnts, associations, and corporations that allow 
r'onsurnption and possession of liquor on their prem-
ieies; and providing a penalty for violation." 
Section 11-10-1 of that act as codified states: 
"Cities and towns within the corporate limits, 
and counties outside of corporate cities and 
towns shall license all establishments, associa-
tions and corporations, except non-profit cor-
poratfo-ns bonded and regulated under provi-
sions of sections 16-6-13.1, 16-6-13.2 and 
16-6-13.3, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as en-
acted by Chapter 25, sections 2, 3, and 4, Laws 
of Utah 1955 that operate a club, business or 
association which allows the customers, mem-
bers or guests to possess or consume liquor 
on the premises, provided the license does not 
permit the licensee, operator or employee of 
either to hold, store, or possess liquor on the 
premises. However, nothing in this section 
shall be construed to prevent persons other 
than the licensee, operator or employees of 
either, from possessing and consuming, but 
not storing, liquor on premises, except as 
otherwise provided for by statute." (Empha-
sis ours.) 
From the foregoing it is clear to see that the 
authority of the cities and towns and counties outside 
of cities and towns shall license all establishments, 
associations and corporations except non-profit cor-
11 
porations bonded arid reg·ulated under the provisions 
of Sections 16-6-13.1, 16-6-13.2 and 16-6-13.3. These 
statutes which were enacted subsequently to Sec. 
10-8-81 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 
circumscribe and limit the authority of cities ancl 
towns to license associations and corporations and 
specifically state that cities cannot license athletic 
clubs and social clubs, recreational or athletic asso-
ciations, or kindred associations, which are n011_ 
profit corporations bonded and regulated by the 
Secretary of State. The concern which the city ex-
presses over the health problem can certainly be 1 
taken care of since the Secretary of State and police 
officers are given the authority to determine whether , 
any ordinances of the cities where these clubs arr 
located are being violated and can revoke their licens~ 
for such violation and this authority is not given to 
the cities and towns but is specifically reserved to 
the Secretary of State. These defendants should not 
be required to be regulated by two masters nor to 
pay license fees or taxes for services of inspection 
done by the city when they are paying them to the 
Secretary of State, who by law is required to regu-
late them. If the city feels that it should regulate , 
these defendants, its recourse is to the legislature · 
and not to the court. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the lower court, dismissing the 
plaintiff's Complaint, should be affirmed. Insofar, 
12 
li\iwever, as the decision of the lower court held that 
the state has not pre-empted to itself the right to 
license and regulate the defendants it is in error and 
should be reversed and remanded with instructions 
to the court to enter judgment denying to the plain-
tiff any right to license or charge a license fee or 
rPgulate the defendants for any purpose whatsoever. 
Respectfully submitted. 
GEORGE J. ROMNEY 
Suite 604 - 315 East 2nd South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for 
Respondents-Defendants. 
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